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A PRIMER ON THE STANDARD FORM CHANGES CLAUSE*
ELDON H. CROWELL** and W. STANFIELD JOHNSON* **
INTRODUCTION
In the most perfect world, where the Federal Government knows
precisely what it wants and the contractor knows precisely what he is
to manufacture or build, there would be no need for a Changes clause.
However, the United States Government could not operate in this im-
perfect world without a Changes clause. The purpose of this article is
to present a basic analysis of the Changes clause.
It is fair to say that this clause is the most important of all the standard
clauses contained in Government contracts. It stands at the center of
the contractual scheme with other clauses referring to and borrowing
its basic procedure as a modus operandi. For this reason, the Changes
clause is what might be termed an "umbrella clause." For example, in-
spection, acceptance, and warranties are involved in the Changes clause.
Defective and erroneous specifications are involved in the Changes
clause. Impossibility of performance and acceleration of performance
are involved in the Changes clause.'
The Changes clause is perhaps the most significant feature of the
Government contract that distinguishes it from the conventional con-
tract. By virtue of this clause, the Government is entitled unilaterally to
change the contract and hold the contractor to performance under the
unilaterally changed contract. It is this significant departure from the
traditional concept of mutuality, with its pointed implications on the
non-governmental party, that sets the Government contract apart from
the conventional commercial contract. That is not to say that this un-
usual arrangement is altogether to the detriment of the contractor. The
Changes clause provides for an equitable compensation, if it is appropriate.
*Based upon remarks delivered by Eldon H. Crowell at the Concentrated Course in
Government Contracts, 1967, presented by the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, in
cooperation with Federal Publications Inc.
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1. See, Spector, An Analysis of the Standard Changes Clause, 25 FED. B.J. 177 (1965).
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Furthermore, the Changes clause, in connection with the Disputes clause,
provides an avenue of relief if a dispute arises as to what is fair com-
pensation. Indeed, the net effect of the Changes clause, as it operates
in connection with the Disputes clause, is to provide a fair procedure for
the administration of a contract designed to permit the Government to
satisfy its needs as expeditiously as possible.
There are a number of forms of the Changes clause in use in Govern-
ment contracts. There are half a dozen such clauses in the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations. The attention of this article is di-
rected to those two clauses having the most frequent use-the Changes
clauses appearing in Standard Form 322 (fixed-price supply) and
Standard Form 23-A 3 (fixed-price construction).
2. The language of this clause, which appears at 41 CFR § 1-16.101 and ASPR 7(103.2,
is as follows:
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and without
notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope of this contract,
in any one or more of the following:
(i) Drawings, designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are
to be specially manufactured for the Government in accordance therewith;
(ii) method of shipment or packing; and
(iii) place of delivery.
If any such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time
required for, the performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether
changed or not changed by any such order, an equitable adjustment shall be made
in the contract price or delivery schedule, or both, and the ocntract shall be
modified in writing accordingly. Any claim by the Contractor for adjustment
under this clause must be asserted within 30 days from the date of receipt by
the Contractor of the notification of change: Provided, however, That the Con-
tracting Officer, if he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and
act upon any such claims asserted at any time prior to final payment under this
contract. Where the cost of property made obsolete or excess as a result of a
change is included in the Contractor's claim for adjustment, the Contracting
Officer shall have the right to prescribe the manner of disposition of such
property. Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a
question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled
"Disputes." However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from
proceeding with the contract as changed.
3. The language of this clause, which appears at 41 CFR § 1-16.401 and ASPR 7-602.3,
is as follows:
The Contracting Officer may, at any time, by written order, and without notice
to the sureties, make changes in the drawings and/or specifications of this contract
if within its general scope. If such changes cause an increase or decrease in the
Contractor's cost of, or time required for, performance of the contract, an
equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract modified in writing ac-
cordingly. Any claim of the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be
asserted in writing within 30 days from the date of receipt by the Contractor
of the notification of change unless the Contracting Officer grants a further period
of time before the date of final payment under the contract. If the parties fail
to agree upon the adjustment to be made, the dispute shall be determined as
provided in Clause 6 of these General Provisions; but nothing provided in this
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The significant phrases in these clauses have their own individual his-
tory, often of crucial importance to a contract dispute. The more im-
portant phrases are discussed under the subheadings below.
AUTHORITY TO ORDER A CHANGE:
"THE CONTRACTING OFFICER"
The opening words of the Changes clause are "The Contracting
Officer." All contractors and their counsel must bear in mind that not
every Government official has authority to issue changes to the contract.
Many are the unfortunate contractors who have failed to heed this
limitation and have been found by contract appeal boards to be noble
but poor volunteers. In this event, the contractor must not only perform
the work without compensation but also runs the risk of having to re-do
the contract work in accordance with its unchanged requirements. 4
Thus it is important to determine what meaning the regulations and
cases give to the contract reference to "The Contracting Officer." Here
there is a slight difference between the supply contract and the construc-
tion contract forms. The supply contract form defines "Contracting
Officer" as "the person executing this contract on behalf of the Govern-
ment, and any other officer or civilian employee who is a properly
designated Contracting Officer; and the term includes ... the authorized
representative of a Contracting Officer acting within the limits of his
authority." 5 In contrast, the standard construction contract defines
"Contracting Officer" as "the person executing this contract on behalf of
the Government, and includes a duly appointed successor or authorized
representative." 6 It can be readily seen that the supply contract seems
to be broader in scope, and seems to encourage the use of multiple Con-
tracting Officers.7
Inevitably, confusion arises as to the authority of Government repre-
sentatives. This confusion usually centers around the determination of
clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the prosecution of the
work as changed. Except as otherwise provided in this contract, no change for
any extra work or material will be allowed.
4. See, e.g., Maxwell Dynamometer Co., ASBCA 5974 & 6055, 61-1 BCA para. 2896;
Universal Match Corp., ASBCA 4797, 59-2 BCA para. 2288.
5. ASPR 7-103.1(b).
6. ASPR 7-602.1 (b).
7. The use of multiple contracting officers is not uncommon. The Air Force and
Army Employ a "Procurement Contracting Officer," "an Administrative Contracting
Officer" and a "Termination Contracting Officer." ASPR 1-201.3. The confusion
provoked by this system is not restricted to those on the contractors' side.
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who is an authorized representative of the Contracting Officer, and
under what conditions the orders of an unauthorized representative
may be binding upon the Government. It is important to emphasize that
the doctrine of apparent authority is not applicable to the field of Gov-
ernment contracts. In Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc.,8 the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals stated:
Were we deciding a dispute between two private parties, rather
than between a private party and the Government, we would not hesi-
tate to hold that the contracting officer had apparent authority to bind
his principal and that the latter was, by the actions of his agent, bound
to the agreement made. These are not, however, two private parties
before us. One of them is the Government and the doctrine of ap-
parent authority cannot be invoked against the Government.
In some instances, however, the Government may be liable for the
costs of a change originally ordered by an unauthorized representative
if the Contracting Officer (a) actually or constructively knew that an
unauthorized representative had directed the change, and (b) either
approved or failed to countermand the change.9 The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals has gone so far as to suggest that, even though
the Contracting Officer may not know of the change (either actually
or constructively), the Government still may be liable.' °
It has been held that a Government inspector is not an authorized
representative of the Contracting Officer for the purposes of the Changes
article." However, under circumstances where the contractor has no
choice but immediately to follow the inspector's extra-contractual direc-
tion, without time for inquiry to the Contracting Officer, the contractor
has been permitted to recover under the Changes clause.'2 Where the
change in contract requirements results from a rejection by an inspector,
the boards have had little difficulty in recognizing the resulting change
because of the inspector's actual authority to inspect and reject."
Furthermore, contractors have received favorable treatment in those
cases where there has been a long acquiescence in a course of conduct
in which persons other than those designated as an authorized represen-
8. ASBCA 9824, 65-2 BCA para. 4868, at 23068-23069.
9. Lox Equipment Co., ASBCA 8905, 1964 BCA para. 4463.
10. Barton & Sons Co., ASBCA 9477, 65-2 BCA para. 4874.
11. R&R Constr. Co., IBCA 413, 65-2 BCA para. 5109.
12. Lox Equipment Co., supra note 9.
13. Warren Painting Co., ASBCA 6511, 61-2 BCA para. 3199.
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tative of the Contracting Officer have acted under the Changes clause.' 4
Similarly, just as changes themselves are often brought about by implica-
tion (constructive change orders), 15 so also may an individual become
an authorized representative of the Contracting Officer by implication
from his course of conduct. For example, in General Cas. Co. v. United
States,16 the Court of Claims stated,
it would be inane indeed to suppose that the Resident Engineer was
at the site for no purpose. We believe . .. that the Resident Engineer
was the authorized representative of the Contracting Officer.
The contractor must face the additional problem that, even though
he is dealing with the Contracting Officer himself, there are instances
where that Contracting Officer's authority to approve payments or
changes can be limited by specific contract provisions. 17
Despite considerable liberality demonstrated by the appeal boards in
their flexible construction of the phrase "The Contracting Officer," the
contractor should exercise care in his own dealings. If there is any
doubt, he should ask the Contracting Officer specifically to direct him
to do any extra work under the Changes clause.
REQUIREMENTS FOR FORMALIZATION:
"BY A WRITTEN ORDER": THE ALL-IMPORTANT
CONCEPT OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE
The language-"By A Written Order"-had a brief and tenuous mo-
ment of significance given it by the Supreme Court in the case of
Plumley v. United States. 8 In this 1913 decision, a contractor's claim
under a Changes clause was denied because there was no written order.
The Court stated that:
[t] here was a total failure to comply with these provisions, and though
it may be a hard case, since the court found that the work was in fact
extra and of considerable value, yet Plumley cannot recover for that
which, though extra, was not ordered by the officer and in the manner
required by the contract.19
14. Hayes International Corp., ASBCA 9750, 65-1 BCA para. 4767; W. Southard Jones,
Inc., ASBCA 6321, 61-2 BCA para. 3182; see also, Globe Indem. Co. v. United States,
102 Ct. CI. 21 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 852 (1945).
15. See, infra.
16. 130 Ct. Cl. 520, 533 (1955).
17. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., supra note 8.
18. 226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913).
19. Id. at 547.
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This decision has only been followed in the rare case where it could
not in some fashion be escaped.2 °
In most other cases, the Court of Claims, obviously regarding the
Plumley principle as harsh, has succeeded in avoiding its consequences.
In the case of Armstrong & Co. v. United States,21 the Court of Claims,
in a three to two decision held that where a change was orally directed
by a responsible officer and the changed work performed, the absence
of the written order required by the contract would not preclude
recovery by the contractor. A similar line of Court of Claims' decisions
has favored contractors by employing a slightly different logic with
the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment and avoiding inequitable
results.2 2
The appeal boards have shown no difficulty with the Plumley de-
cision. Before the appeal boards, according to ASBCA Chairman Spector,
the Plumley approach is not argued "very seriously." 21 A written order
is not required by the Board.2 4 These boards simply regard as done
that which should have been done and direct the Contracting Officer
to grant the relief found to be due the contractor.25 This equitable ap-
proach has produced the "constructive change order."
The boards' approach to this seemingly simple question of interpreta-
tion has had far reaching implications both on the scope of the Changes
clause's operation and on the jurisdiction of the boards themselves. The
Changes clause, in connection with the Disputes clause, provides the
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the appeal boards. It may thus
be seen that, as the Changes clause is given a narrow, literal interpreta-
tion, the boards' jurisdiction diminishes. Conversely, as the boards con-
strue the Changes clause liberally and flexibly, their action not only pro-
duces a just result, but it also enlarges their jurisdiction and significance
in the Government contracting scheme.21
20. Globe Indem. Co. v. United States, supra note 14.
21. 98 Ct. Cl. 519 (1943).
22. Williams v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 435 (1955); Whitman v. United States, 124
Ct. Cl. 464 (1953).
23. Spector, An Analysis of the Standard Changes Clause, supra note 1.
24. E.g., Gil-Brown Constructors, Inc., IBCA 504-265, 66-2 BCA para. 5980.
25. E.g., Lillard's, ASBCA 6630, 61-1 BCA para. 3053. This is not to say, however, that
where the contractor has voluntarily performed work beyond the contract require-
ments, without any direction, either written or oral, that he will obtain relief. Blake
Constr. Co., Inc., ASBCA 3406, 57-1 BCA para. 1281; C. H. Leavell & Co., ASBCA 4899,
59-2 BCA para. 2291.
26. Such liberal interpretation also has the effect, in connection with recent Supreme
Court decisions, of significantly diminishing the original "breach of contract" jurisdic-
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The constructive change order is a simple mechanism whereby the
board directs the Contracting Officer to do retroactively that which he
should have done in the beginning. Sometimes the board does not even
direct that a change order be issued, but simply holds that the actions
of the Contracting Officer constituted the change order itself.27 Actual-
ly, what has often occurred is that the Contracting Officer has breached
the contract. The classic instance is, of course, when the Contracting
Officer requires work that is beyond the contract requirements or has
incorrectly interpreted the contract and demands of the contractor more
than the specification requirements. 28 But the constructive change is not
restricted to this classic instance. It applies to a great range of practical
problems in the performance of Government contracts, including factual
situations covered by the concepts of impossibility of performance 29
and acceleration."0 Indeed the concept of the constructive change
order is so broad as to permit this recent definition:
Any conduct by a C.O. (or other Govt. representative authorized to
order changes) which is not a formal change order, but which has
the effect of requiring you to perform work different from that pre-
scribed by the original terms of your contract, constitutes a construc-
tive change order-entitling you to relief under the "Changes" clause.31
tion of the Court of Claims. See United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966)
(particularly n.6).
27. The board, seeing an instance where the Contracting Officer should have taken
or foregone a certain course of action, pursuant to a change order in compliance with
the contractual duty to cooperate and not hinder performance, decides the case as if the
change order had been issued. Hayes International Corp., ASBCA 9750, 65-1 BCA para.
4767; Noonan Constr. Co., ASBCA 8320, 1963 BCA para. 3638.
28. Aero Serv. Corp., ASBCA 4249, 58-1 BCA para. 1683; Polan Indus., Inc., ASBCA
3996, et seq., 58-2 BCA para. 1982; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., ASBCA 1689 (1954).
29. The boards have often found it possible to grant relief in such difficult situations
when the contractor finds it cannot perform in the manner contemplated by the
parties at the time the contract was signed. Although these situations could well be
categorized as a breach of contract and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the board,
the boards, however, have chosen to adopt the more imaginative approach of a con-
structive change, declaring that the Contracting Officer should have issued a change
order at the time the contract was awarded affording relief from the impossible re-
quirement. See, e.g., Cuneo & Crowell, Impossibility of Performance-Assumption of
Risk or Act of Submission?, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 531 (1964).
30. By means of this practical reasoning, the administrative boards have treated
Government orders to speed up the performance of the contract as changes under the
standard Changes clause, thus providing the contractor with a contractual right to an
equitable adjustment for the cost of accelerating performance. See, e.g., Cuneo &
Ackerly, Acceleration, G.W. GovT. CoNmACrs MONOGRAPH No. 9 (1964).
31. Vom Baur, Constructive Change Orders, Briefing Papers, No. 65-1, GovT. CON-
TRACTOR (1965) at p. 2.
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Thus the Changes clause has come a long way from the 1913 Plumley
decision. 32 By devising a practical means of escaping the literal limitations
of the Changes clause, the boards have assumed jurisdiction and have
provided administrative relief. The Court of Claims has approved this
use by the administrative boards of the doctrine of the constructive
change.33 As a result, the Government contract lawyer finds that a sub-
stantial portion of his dealings with the Changes clause involve con-
structive change orders.
THE LI MITS OF THE CHANGES CLAUSE:
WITHIN THE "GENERAL SCOPE" OF THE CONTRACT
The Changes clause states that the Contracting Officer's power to
make changes is limited to those changes which are within the scope
of the contract. The supply contract clause uses the language-"within
the general scope of this contract." The construction contract expresses
the same thought through the phrase-"if within its general scope." Thus
it is important in many situations to determine what the words "general
scope" mean.
Considerable confusion has been caused by misuse of these words.
Frequently both contractors and the Government representatives speak
of any change that results in additional costs as a change in scope. This
is not accurate and there is a distinction, with significant legal conse-
quences, between a change causing extra work and a change which is
beyond the general scope of the contract.34
The meaning of "general scope" is, as might be expected, a matter
of degree. The distinction between those changes which are within the
scope and those beyond it is often obscure. In Saddler v. United States,35
a change increasing earth work from 8,000 cu. yds. to over 13,000 cu.
yds. was held to be outside the general scope of the contract. In
Stapleton Constr. Co. v. United States,36 a change requiring that a
foundation be placed on previously unspecified piles was held to be
beyond the scope of the contract. The elimination of a $99,000 nurses'
quarters from a hospital contract totalling $911,000 was held to be
32. Supra note 18.
33. Midwest Spray & Coating Co. v. United States, No. 354-64, Ct. Cl., dec. July 15,
1966; also Jefferson Constr. v. United States, No. 218-64, Ct. C., dec. Nov. 10, 1966; Jack
Stone Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 370 (Ct. C1. 1965).
34. See Henderson v. United States, 169 Ct. C1. 228 (1965).
35. 152 Ct. Cl. 557 (1961).
36. 92 Ct. C1. 551 (1940).
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beyond the scope.37 The Court explained its approach to this issue in
Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States:8
Since the right to make changes was reserved to defendant, it can-
not be liable for breach of contract for its exercise of that right, unless
the changes were cardinal changes and exceeded the discretion which
the Changes article vested in the contracting officer. See Aragona
Construction Company, Inc. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 382 (1964).
The reported decisions do not establish clear lines of demarcation
between changes which may be said to come properly within the
Changes article of Government contracts and cardinal changes which
constitute breaches of contract. Certain guidelines in the decided
cases are, however, helpful in determining how a given change should
be regarded. In Saddler v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 557, 561, 287 F.2d
441 (1961), the court stated:
We think that a determination of the permissive degree of change
can only be reached by considering the totality of the change and
this requires recourse to its magnitude as well as its quality.3 9
A similar ad hoc approach to this question is demonstrated by the
recent Court of Claims' decision in Luria Bros. & Co. v. United States.40
The main significance of whether a change is within the scope or out-
side the scope of the contract is in the type of compensation which a
contractor will receive for the change and the jurisdiction of an ad-
ministrative board to grant relief. If the alteration in the contract is
held to be a change, he may receive an equitable adjustment at the ad-
ministrative level. If the alteration is beyond the scope of the contract,
he may recover damages in the Court of Claims.41
Furthermore, if a change is beyond the scope of the contract and is
therefore a breach of the contract, then theoretically the contractor may
-not be required to proceed with the change.42 The contractor may stop
37. Saddler v. United States, supra note 35; see F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United
States, 131 Ct. Cl. 501 (1955).
38. No. 277-56, Ct. Cl., dec. July 15, 1966.
39. Id. at 14.
40. No. 475-59, Ct. Cl., dec. December 16, 1966.
41. It should be noted, however, that even if a directed change is "beyond the scope"
but is accepted and agreed to by the contractor, it will be, in effect, a valid amendment
or modification to the contract, binding on both parties.
42. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); G. L. Christian & Assoc.
v. United States 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), recon. denied (with opinion) 320 F.2d 345
(Cr. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), rehearing on cert. denied, 376 U.S.
929 (1964), 377 U.S. 1010 (1964).
[Vol. 8:550
THE STANDARD FORM CHANGES CLAUSE
work and sue for breach of contract. This, however, is a perilous course
for any contractor to adopt.43
An interesting problem is posed as to what is the legal result if the
Contracting Officer issues an order calling for work beyond the scope of
the contract. Clearly, if the contractor does the work he is entitled to
be reimbursed. This reimbursement occurs by the application of the
constructive change doctrine discussed previously.44 While the Court of
Claims has indicated that a contractor may stop work if the Government
breaches the contract, that court has never decided a case precisely on
those grounds. However, the facts of C. W. Schmid Plumbing &
Heating v. United States,45 would seem to indicate possible grounds
for recovery other than damages for breach of contract.
46
WHAT MAY BE CHANGED
Neither the standard form construction nor the standard form sup-
ply contract Changes clauses contain specific language which allows the
Contracting Officer to make changes in the time for delivery. There is
no specific provision allowing the Contracting Officer to accelerate de-
livery unilaterally. The construction contract clause authorizes only
changes "in the drawings and/or specifications." 47 The supply contract
clause permits changes only in the
(i) Drawings, designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be
furnished are to be specially manufactured for the Government in ac-
cordance therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii)
place of delivery.48
The effort has therefore been to fit changes of time for performance into
the Changes clause, even though the language of these clauses does not
readily support equitable adjustment claims for changes in time for per-
formance.49
Nonetheless, it has been held that the Contracting Officer may ac-
43. C. W. Schmid Plumbing & Heating v. United States 351 F.2d 351 (Ct. C1. 1965).
44. Jack Stone Co., Inc. v. United States, supra note 33.
45. Supra note 43.
46. See the discussion, infra, at 568.
47. Supra note 3.
48. Supra note 2.
49. Indeed the Comptroller General has ruled that the Changes Clause of the Supply
Contract does not permit the inclusion of time for performance under the specification.
Comp. Gen. Dec. B-149895 (Oct. 1, 1963, unpublished).
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celerate deliveries unilaterally; and, in turn, the contractor may receive
an equitable adjustment for the increased costs resulting therefrom.
Modifications in the time for contract performance may, for example,
come within the Changes clause even though such modifications are
not specifically mentioned in that article. Time for performance is often
set forth in the specifications of the contract, and, of course, the Changes
clause covers changes in specifications. In such a case, the Contracting
Officer's order to accelerate comes within the term "specifications" in
the Changes clause. This has been the view adopted in construction
contracts.5 ° There is also some indication that, even though the schedule
is not in the specification, acceleration claims may be allowed under the
Changes clause.5 '
In summary, this jurisdictional problem has been more conceptual
than real as the boards have been permissive in their treatment of the
authorizing language.
ASPECTS OF THE EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT:
"INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE COST OF" WHAT?
The subject of the equitable adjustment has been treated extensively
in numerous articles.52 Although this article, therefore, does not address
itself to the concept of measuring the contractor's damage which has
been used in computing equitable adjustments, one problem is worthy
of mention. There is a significant difference in the equitable adjustment
language between the supply contract and the construction contract
standard forms. And therein lies a tale of major importance in the his-
tory of the Changes clause.53
This major difference directly affects the nature of the costs that can
be recovered under the Changes clause. The supply contract clause
provides as follows:
50. Melrose Waterproofing Co., ASBCA 9058, 1964 BCA para. 4119; Leo Sanders, BCA
1468, 4 CCF para. 60,526 (1949); Samuels & Gundling, BCA 1147, 4 CCF para. 60,703
(1949).
51. E.g., Ensign-Bickford Co., ASBCA 6214, 60-2 BCA para. 2817.
52. Ribakoff, Equitable Adjustments Under Government Contracts, G.W. GovT. CoN-
TRACTS MONOGRAPH No. 3 (1962); Spector, Confusion in the Concept of the Equitable
Adjustment in Government Contracts, 22 Fmo. B.J. 5 (1962); McBride, Confusion in the
Concept of the Equitable Adjustment in Government Contracts: A Reply, 22 FED. B.J.
235 (1962).
53. It should also be noted that the Government may also receive an adjustment
should the cost of performance be reduced. Supra notes 2 and 3.
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if the change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time
required for performance of any part of the work under this contract,
whether changed or not changed by such order, an equitable adjust-
ment shall be made in the contract price or delivery schedule or both.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The construction contract lacks the underscored language-"whether
changed or not changed by such order." As a result, the equitable ad-
justment in the case of a supply contract change has generally been
broader in concept than that in a construction contract.5
The underscored language was added to the supply contract because
of adverse reaction to the so-called Rice doctrine.55 The Rice doctrine
was interpreted by some to mean that a contractor was entitled to re-
cover money only for the additional cost he incurred in doing the
changed work itself. Under this point of view, if the change had a cost
effect on the remainder of the work, these additional costs were not re-
coverable. 56 This cost effect was usually in the form of a delay or dis-
ruption to the unchanged work. The Rice doctrine thus provided the
Government with a ready defense which was simply described by the
slogans "Time for time, and money for work," or "no pay for delay."
Because time obviously costs money, there was an opposition to the
Rice doctrine shared both by Government and contractors' lawyers. A
strong statement of opposition, and undoubtedly the most significant,
was expressed by the present Vice Chairman of the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, Joel P. Shedd, in an article entitled The Rice
Doctrine and the Ripple Effects of Changes.57
The result of this reaction was an effort to modify the contract so
that the contractors might, to some extent, be relieved of this injustice.
One such change was the addition of the underscored language to the
supply contract Changes clause. The addition of this "unchanged work"
language has thus permitted supply contractors to recover the costs of
the impact of changes.58
Construction contractors, however, were not so fortunate. The Sus-
54. See, e.g., Weldfab, Inc., IBCA 268, 61-2 BCA para. 3121; Lumen, Inc., ASBCA
8364, 1964 BCA para. 4436; Szemco, Inc., ASBCA 9892, 1964 BCA para. 4503.
55. Chouteau v. United States, 95 U.S. 61 (1877); H. E. Crook Co. v. United States,
270 U.S. 4 (1926); United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942); United States v. Howard
P. Foley Co., 329 U.S. 64 (1946).
56. Ibid.
57. 32 G.W.L. REv. 62 (1963).
58. E.g., Crane Carrier Corp., ASBCA 9822, 65-2 BCA para. 4945.
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pension of Work clause, and its successor clause,59 have permitted re-
covery of delay costs (but not profit) where the delay has been so un-
reasonable as to constitute a breach or has arisen from a breach.6 ° But
these contractual modifications have not filled the gap, nor have they
quelled the resistance to the common interpretation of the Rice doctrine.
In 1966, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals released a
Chairmen's decision stating that it did not have jurisdiction over a
claim involving impact costs on unchanged work.61 The Board declared:
simply stated, this doctrine precludes payment under the Changes
article for costs of work not changed. 62
Not all of the ASBCA Chairmen were in agreement. A strong dissenting
opinion was presented by Vice Chairman Shedd.63 This dissenting
opinion cited as its authority a series of cases under which, according to
Mr. Shedd, the Court of Claims had reversed the board and allowed
recovery for costs akin to the so-called ripple costs. 64
Even more recent events, however, indicate that the construction con-
tract Changes clause may receive a more liberal interpretation, and one
that is more consistent with traditional legal principles of recoverable
damages. The Department of Commerce Appeals Board rejected the
Government's usual Rice argument in the appeal of A. L. Harding.65
The Board took this position:
We think the Government's analysis and conclusion in respect to this
claim was wrong. It reflects a much too literal reading of the contract
provision relating to "Delays" as well as the Rice rule, not at all in
keeping with the recent trend in the handling of claims of this nature.
(See, Shedd, Rice Doctrine and Ripple Effects of Changes, Vol. 32,
G.W. Law Review, pp. 62-81 (1963), and Reda, Impact Costs of Ac-
59. Price adjustment for suspension, delay, or interruption of work, FPR 1-7.602.1,
ASPR 7-604.3.
60. E.g., George A. Fuller Co., ASBCA 8524, 1962 BCA para. 3619. The Court of
Claims has recently indicated that it views the suspension of work clauses as allowing
compensation for delay even where no breach of contract is involved. Bateson Constr.
Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 135 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
61. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., ASBCA 9866, 66-1 BCA para. 5307.
62. 66-1 BCA at 24,953.
63. 66-1 BCA at 24,956.
64. Gardner Display Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585 (1965); C. W. Schmid v.
United States, supra note 43; Laburnum Construction Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451
(Ct. Cl. 1964); J. D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
65. DCAB 44, 65-2 BCA para. 5261, aff'd on recon., 66-1 BCA para. 5463.
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celeration, Spring 1962 issue, Fed. B.J., and cases cited therein.)
Simply stated, U.S. v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942), the case from which the
doctrine derives its name, decided that the "changes" clause permits
payment only for additional expenses directly attributable to the
changed work, but consequential damages to unchanged work are not
compensable. However, the important question remains under that
rule as to the nature of the direct costs of a change which are com-
pensable; and in this connection it is now well established that such costs
may include, inter alia, the increased cost of performance caused by
disruption of the contract work if and insofar as such disruption was
a direct result of the change. 66
This view was recently adopted by the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals in a March 15, 1967 decision, concurred in both by Chair-
man Spector and Vice Chairman Shedd. In Hardeman-Monier-Hutch-
erson, the Board expressed its new position in these terms:
... In the ordinary change order directing a structural change, this
doctrine may dictate a harsh result, but it presents no difficulty in
application. In the wider area of constructive changes, or changes by
implication, the application is often more difficult, for the dividing line
between changed and unchanged work is less readily apparent. Also
the scope of the change which has occurred is being reconstructed
after the fact. To overcome this problem the boards have returned
to a modified application of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, supra.
It is now frequently held that costs are allowable under the Changes
article if such costs are the direct, as distinct from remote, result of
the change. 67
Thus the contractor was permitted to recover standby costs resulting
from the change. How far these new authorities may be taken by
counsel for contractors is not yet clear. But intriguing possibilities and
new opportunities under the construction contract Changes clause are
being developed.6"
66. 65-2 BCA at 24,777.
67. ASBCA 11785, 67-1 BCA para. 6210 at 28,749. Significantly two of the three cases
cited by the Board for the quoted proposition-Northeastern Eng'r, Inc., ASBCA 5732,
61-1 BCA para. 3026, and Ivey Bros. Constr. Co., Eng. BCA 1764 (1960)-were those cases
cited by Mr. Shedd in his Rice Doctrine law review article cited, supra note 57.
68. Notice also that, in the Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson decision, the ASBCA
recognizes the Court of Claims' decision in Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States,
supra note 64, as holding that the Rice Doctrine is not applicable where the costs
claimed result from the "fault of the Government." It may well be that contractors will
consequently abandon the suspension clause in such cases and bring delay claims under
the Changes clause, which, unlike the suspension clause, allows recovery of profit.
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REQUIRED NOTIFICATION OF CLAIMS:
"WITHIN 30 DAYS"
The Changes clause requires that a contractor assert his claim, for
equitable adjustment, or give notice of it, "within 30 days" of notifica-
tion of the change. The supply contract Changes clause does not
require that the notice be in writing, whereas under the construction
contract Changes clause notice of the claim for equitable adjustment
must be in writing.6 9
The 30-day provision of the Changes clause is discretionary. The
Changes clause for both supply and construction contracts provides that
the Contracting Officer may receive and act upon any such claim as-
serted at any time prior to final payment. And it has been regularly
held that he should do so in any case where his ability to evaluate the
claim has not been prejudiced by the passage of more than 30 days.70
The Armed Services Board has held that the refusal of the Contracting
Officer to consider a late claim must be reasonable, and that a refusal
solely on the ground of untimeliness is not reasonable.71 The Depart-
ment of Interior Board of Contract Appeals has taken the same view
on this question. The Interior Board has held that a Contracting Of-
ficer's refusal to waive the untimely filing of notice is a matter which
the board may review on appeal. It has also held that, when there is no
prejudice to the Government, untimeliness will not bar a contractor's
claim. In Monarch Lumber Co.,72 this board adopted and quoted the
principle stated in the early decision in Sanders:
Its true purpose is the protection against delays that are injurious to
the Government's interests. If not injurious then, of course, there is no
object in applying the rule.73
This principle has been applied in recent decisions.7 4 It should be em-
phasized, however, that a showing of prejudice will make the 30-day
69. Supra notes 2 and 3.
70. H. L. Yoh Co. v. United States, 153 Ct. Cl. 104 (1961); Anderson-Nichols & Co.,
ASBCA 6524, 61-2 BCA para. 3204; J. W. Merz, IBCA 64, 59-1 BCA para. 2085; Hot-
point Co., ASBCA 3745, 57-2 BCA para. 1513.
71. Remler Co., ASBCA 1113 (1952).
72. IBCA 217, 60-2 BCA para. 2674.
73. WDBCA 955, 3 CCF 862, 866 (1945).
74. E. W. Bliss Co., ASBCA 9584, 65-1 BCA para. 4610; Fletcher Aviation Corp.,
ASBCA 7669 & 8542, 1964 BCA para. 4192; see Buford, Notice Requirements Under
Govermnent Construction Contracts, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 275, 280-81 (1959).
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rule a bar. In C. C. Terry,75 where the delay prevented the Contracting
Officer from verifying the allegations, the board found that the Govern-
ment had been prejudiced and barred the claim.
The most detailed analysis of the question of timeliness appears in
Korshoj Constr. Co.,76 where the Interior Board stated the rule as
follows:
The rule that a failure to comply with a contractual protest or notice
requirement prevents consideration of the claim by a board or a court
is not absolute, but is subject to certain well recognized exceptions.
This board and other appeal boards, in accordance with applicable
court decisions, have held that a formal protest or notice is not neces-
sary where:
(a) the records of the government show that the contracting officer
or his authorized representative in fact knew of the circumstances
that formed the basis of the alleged extra, changed condition.
(b) the contracting officer actually considered the contractor's claim
on its merits without invoking the protest or notice requirement.
(c) the failure to protest or notify is not prejudicial or injurious of the
interests of the government.77
Suppose, however, the Contracting Officer finds that there are no
circumstances present on which to justify consideration of a claim which
has been untimely filed? This question was decided when the ASBCA
held that an unqualified refusal by the Contracting Officer to con-
sider a request for additional compensation asserted more than 30 days
after notice of the change, the Contracting Officer having decided that
no extenuating circumstances were present, is an appealable issue.
78
The boards have recognized that, under the existing Changes clause,
the 30-day notice provision does not apply with regard to a constructive
change. For example in Carlin-Atlas,79 the GSA Board stated in denying
the Government's motion to dismiss:
It is likewise well settled that the 30-day limitation provision in the
"Changes" clause relating to the submission of claims for changes is
75. IBCA 330, 1963 BCA para. 3805.
76. IBCA 321, 1963 BCA para. 3848, 3865, 1964 BCA para. 4206.
77. 1963 BCA para. 3848 at 19,168.
78. Burton-Rodgers, Inc., ASBCA 5438, 60-1 BCA para. 2558.
79. GSBCA 2061, 66-2 BCA para. 5872.
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not applicable where the Contracting Officer has not issued a written
change order and where the claims are based on alleged constructive
changes. MECCO, Inc., ASBCA No. 9849, 65-2 BCA 5132. Accord-
ingly, the bar for lack of timely submission of the claim cannot be
raised by the Contracting Officer and the Government in the present
appeal inasmuch as the Appellant's claim was asserted on the basis of
alleged constructive change.80
This rule should be clear from the language of the Changes clause
itself, which requires that adjustment claims be asserted within 30 days
after receipt of the formal, written change order contemplated by the
clause.8
The Court of Claims decision in Copco Steel & Eng'r Co. v. United
States,8 2 sets forth the general rule as to all notice requirements in gov-
ernment contracts:
Lack of strict compliance with many kinds of contract requirements
concerning writings and notifications have frequently been held to be
of no consequence where the conduct of the parties have made it clear
that formal adherence would serve no useful purpose or that the parties
have in fact waived it. Thompson v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 166, 179
(1940) (failure of contractor to assert a claim for adjustment of
change order in 10 days waived in view of defendant's later considera-
tion of claim on merits); Guyler v. United States, 161 Ct. CI. 159
(1963) (failure of contractor to make a timely 30-day claim for
equitable adjustment waived by consideration of claim on merits);
Shepherd v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 724, 732, 113 F. Supp. 648 (1953)
(failure of contractor to give notice of changed condition immaterial
in view of defendant's knowledge of the condition); Whitman, et al.
v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 464, 110 F. Supp. 444 (1953) (contract
provision that amount of changed order be set forth at time of issuance
does not preclude recovery where parties adopted a procedure of
waiting until completion of contract to determine amounts due);
McShain v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 280, 65 F. Supp. 589 (1946)
(contractor permitted recovery for performance of extra work without
80. 66-2 BCA at 27,265.
81. See Todd Shipyards Corp., ASBCA 2911 & 2912, 57-1 BCA para. 1185. Neverthe-
less, after contractor does delay unreasonably in submitting his request for equitable ad-
justment under a constructive change theory, the boards may declare that such an
unreasonable delay results in substantial prejudice to the Government and the claim
is barred. Eggers & Higgins, VACAB 537, 66-1 BCA para. 5525 (5Y2 year delay).
82. 341 F.2d 590 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
[Vol. 8:550
THE STANDARD FORM CHANGES CLAUSE
formal written change orders where parties adopted procedure of post-
poning all claims for extras until completion of job). 83
This statement should not provide comfort to the contract administra-
tor, but may support the claim of a contractor whose administrator has
failed to give the prescribed notice to the Government.
THE CONTRACTOR'S OBLIGATION TO KEEP WORKING:
"NOTHING IN THIS CLAUSE SHALL ExCUSE THE CONTRACTOR
FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE CONTRACT AS CHANGED"
A truly unconventional limitation is thrust upon the contractor by
the concluding language of the clauses, which clearly require him to
continue with the work as changed. This requirement stands even
though there is a dispute arising from the change. If a contractor re-
fuses to perform, he is subject to termination for default.84 Therefore,
if agreement cannot be reached on an equitable adjustment, the Con-
tracting Officer should not hesitate to issue a unilateral determination,
giving a final decision subject to appeal under the Disputes clause. The
contractor, in the meantime, must perform the work.
There are cases, however, where the change is unauthorized-such as
those beyond the scope of the contract. In these instances, the contrac-
tor may have the right to walk off the job. As the Court of Claims
stated in Henderson v. United States:85
If it [the Contracting Officer's order] was a breach, the prime con-
tractor thereupon had the option of abandoning performance under
the contract and suing for any damages that had been sustained as of
the time of the breach (Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540,
552 (1894)) or of proceeding with the erection of the buildings despite
the interference and then, after the completion of the job, instituting
an action for the damages sustained as a result of the breach of contract
(United States v. Smith, 94 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1876)).
However, this is a dangerous action for a contractor to take and it has
seldom been successful.
The case of C. W. Schmid Plumbing & Heating v. United States,88
83. Id. at 616. The Government, in contrast, is not restricted by the 30-day provision,
but has been required to assert its claim within a reasonable time.
84. Dave & Gerben Contr. Co., ASBCA 6257, 1962 BCA para. 3493.
85. Supra note 34, at 241.
86. Supra note 43.
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is illustrative, even though it had an ultimately favorable ending. This
unusual controversy had its beginning in 1956 when the Corps of En-
gineers solicited bids for a proposed addition to a heating plant at a
midwestern Air Force base. The AFB required bidders to submit data
on the boiler proposed to be furnished. Schmid submitted a bid with
the data sheet naming a certain company's boiler. Before the bids were
opened, however, Schmid received a lower quote from a second boiler
company. As a result, he reduced his bid price accordingly. He re-
ceived the award of the contract, and started work on the foundation
for the boilers from the second company. He submitted for approval
shop drawings indicating the second company's boiler. The Contracting
Officer insisted upon boilers from the company named on the data sheet
submitted with Schmid's bid.
The normal procedure at this point would have been for the con-
tractor to acquiesce in the Contracting Officer's demand, but treat it as
a change and submit *a claim for equitable adjustment under the Changes
clause. Such a claim would have been successful. 7 But this was not
Schmid's reaction. He insisted that the boiler shown on his shop draw-
ings met the specifications, and that the Contracting Officer could not
force him to use the more expensive boilers without a change order and
an equitable adjustment. Schmid refused to proceed with the work until
the Contracting Officer acquiesced in this view. Some months later, the
Contracting Officer's superiors reversed his decision. Schmid, there-
fore, renewed his prosecution of the work.
At the same time, he submitted a claim for the standby costs incurred
during the time the incorrect decision of the Contracting Officer was in
force. The Contracting Officer denied his claim in 1958 and was sus-
tained by the Corps of Engineers in 1961 and the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals in 1962.88
Finally, in October 1965-over eight years after the date of the con-
structure change-the U. S. Court of Claims allowed Schmid's claim.
In its decision, the Court seems to rely primarily on the fact that the
contractor's actions saved the Government money. The Court stated:
... we think it would be anomalous and a miscarriage of justice to
declare that the contractor would have been entitled to an equitable
adjustment had he followed the erroneous order and thereby increased
the government's cost, but to hold he may not recover the costs that
87. Jack Stone Co. v. United States, supra note 33.
88. ASBCA 7738, 1962 BCA para. 3458.
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resulted from an admittedly correct position, which provided a sub-
stantial saving to the government. The provision in the Disputes
clause about proceeding with the work should not be interpreted to
prevent recovery in a case such as this where the government was
wholly benefited by the contractor's failure to proceed with the work.89
Thus, Schmid was victorious and his rugged stand against the United
States was, to some extent, sustained.
But it is worth reflecting that he probably would have recovered
earlier and perhaps more, had he treated the Contracting Officer's er-
roneous decision as a constructive change order, proceeded with the
work, and filed a claim for equitable adjustment. Though Mr. Schmid's
story is an interesting one in the history of the Changes clause, it does
not indicate a recommended practice.
PROPOSED NEw CONSTRUCTIoN CONTRACT CHANGES CLAUSE
In September 1963, the General Services Administration requested
agency views concerning the advisability of modifying the Changes
clause of the standard form construction contract. By virtue of this
request, there was formed an inter-agency working group to draft the
proposed new language. This working group issued its report in March
of 1966. It recommended new language for the Changes, Changed
Conditions, and Suspension of Work articles. The recommended
Changes clause revision is as follows:
(a) The Contracting Officer may, at any time by written order and
without notice to the sureties make changes within the general scope
of the work under this contract. Any act or failure to act by the Con-
tracting Officer, which causes any such change, shall be treated as if
a written order therefor has been issued; provided, that in the absence
of a written order for a change, the Contractor shall promptly inform
the Contracting Officer in writing that such act or failure to act is
considered to be an ordered change. If any such changes cause an
increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or time required for,
performance of the contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made and
the contract modified in writing accordingly. Where such changes
delay or postpone the performance of all or any part of the work for
an unreasonable period of time, the equitable adjustment shall include
an increase in the cost of performance necessarily caused by such un-
reasonable delay or postponement. However, no adjustment shall be
89. 173 Ct. CI. at 310.
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made for any such delay or postponement to the extent that per-
formance would have been so delayed or postponed by any other cause.
(b) If the Contractor intends to assert a claim for an equitable ad-
justment under this clause by reason of the receipt of a change order,
or by reason of any act or failure to act by the Contracting Officer,
he must, within thirty (30) days thereafter, submit to the Contracting
Officer a notice in writing together with a statement setting forth the
general nature and extent of such claim, unless this period is extended
by the Government; but this requirement shall not apply where the
Government has not been prejudiced by the absence of that submis-
sion.
(c) No claim for an equitable adjustment shall be asserted after final
payment under this contract.
(d) If the parties fail to agree upon the existence of a change or upon
the adjustment to be made, the dispute shall be determined as provided
in Clause 6 of these General Provisions; but nothing in this clause shall
excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the prosecution of the
work as changed or as directed by the Contracting Officer.
Various groups in the American Bar Association and other bar asso-
ciations have been given the opportunity to comment on the appropriate-
ness of the newly drafted language. As of this time, no final recom-
mendation has been made with regard to this proposed clause. Nor has
it been put into effect by any of the major procuring departments or
agencies of the Government.
The proposal faithfully reflects the history of the existing Changes
clause. This is not surprising, since the draftsmen have attempted both
to formalize the doctrines of constructiveness devised by the appeal
boards, and to solve the problems which the boards' ingenuity has been
hitherto inadequate to cure. The proposed clause recognizes and for-
malizes the concept of the constructive change order. It seeks to avoid
the Rice doctrine by permitting recovery of suspension-type costs under
the Changes clause. Finally, the proposed clause attempts to remedy a
problem that Government lawyers and administrators have complained
of for some time-namely the absence of a notice requirement where the
change is a constructive one.90
It is fair to say that these proposed changes have not had the approval
of the Government Contracts Bar. Indeed, the authors understand that
90. Nelson, The Changes Clause and a Suggestion, 9 AF JAG L. REv. 37 (1967).
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the proposals have been abandoned for the most part, and new proposals
are in the making. A few observations may explain why.
No one can deny that the Rice doctrine has been a harsh rule. Prior
to the recent Harding9' and Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson9Z2 decisions,
which finally permit a sensible construction of the existing Changes
clause, no one would have gainsayed the benefits of a specific modifica-
tion of the Changes clause. Hopefully, however, this is no longer neces-
sary. Furthermore, the proposed modification is far more restrictive
than the traditional Hadley v. Baxendale93 concept which the boards
now may be willing to apply. Thus, the proposed change may not go
far enough, leaving behind a residue of the unjust Rice rule. If any
change is necessary, the addition of the supply contract's "unchanged
work" language might be most suitable.
The doctrine of the constructive change order is a useful one, well
administered by the appeal boards. The necessity for formalizing it is
open to question. Indeed the result of such a formalization might well be
the sterilization of a flexible and fruitful concept.
The proposed addition of a notice requirement for constructive
changes is premised on a misapprehension of the fundamental nature of
the constructive change order concept. The constructive change is
fundamentally no more than a breach of contract given administrative
cognizance by the appeal boards. It would appear that the proposed
language creates a scheme whereby such a breach would not be con-
sidered a constructive change and treated as redressable, unless the con-
tractor "promptly" characterizes the breach as a change. 94 The pro-
posal thus places the administrative onus squarely on the aggrieved
party. The proposal also thrusts the boards' flexible doctrine of fairness
into a rigid procedural hassle. The net result of the proposal, if adopted,
would thus be twofold:
1. To deprive procedurally unsophisticated but equally aggrieved
contractors of breach of contract rights; and
2. To foster a divisive and costly proliferation of formal claims by
sophisticated contractors who may fear that ostensibly small damages
may potentially be aggravated and increased.
The merit of the constructive change order concept is that it works
91. Supra note 65.
92. Supra note 67.
93. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
94. This is also the suggestion of Lt. Col. Nelson in the article cited, supra note 90.
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effectively, flexibly, and fairly under its case-by-case administration by
the appeal boards. Such a valuable concept should not be lost in a
shuffle of papers because of an instinct for formality.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Changes clause acts both for the benefit of the
Government and for the benefit of the contractor. The Government
must have the authority to change the plans and specifications, to ac-
celerate performance, and to make other changes in both construction
and supply contracts which will alter and often improve the final
product. The Changes clause works for the benefit of the contractor
in that he must be adequately compensated if the Government is to
reserve to itself the right to make changes. The Changes clause, as it
stands at the center of the Government contracting scheme, is thus an
effective instrument for the administration of the unusual contract be-
tween Government and citizen.
